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ABSTRACT
The Treaty of Tilsit of 1807 between Russia and 
France was a minor slowing of the flow of the Napoleonic 
Wars that dominated Europe in the early nineteenth cen­
tury. It united the two nations against Britain, but, in 
larger terms, it polarized continental Europe into two 
separate (or distinct) conflicting spheres. The treaty 
and its effects provided a foreshadowing of post-World 
War I Europe and the subsequent twentieth-century concept 
of peaceful coexistence.
The major personalities involved in making the 
treaty were Alexander I of Russia and Napoleon Bonaparte 
of France. Their meeting on a boat in the Niemen River 
had frequently been depicted as a romantic convergence of 
east and west, yet, the theatrical air of these conversa­
tions quickly disintegrated into the polarization of 
France and Russia after 1807. But the general mood of 
the period, at least for Russia, was one of hopeful 
anticipation.
The diplomacy of Polish Prince Adam Jerzy 
Czartoryski, who served as Alexander's Foreign Minister 
in the period leading up to the actual negotiations, 
suggested an uncanny understanding of European realities
vi
along with a heightened sense of idealism and a desire 
for continental peace. But the Treaty of Tilsit was never 
intended to bring peace and serve as a permanent agreement.
In the end, the treaty offered Russia the opportunity 
to join the theater of European affairs as an equal mem­
ber. The treaty defined Russia, formerly an unknown 
quantity of the east, as a legitimate power in the affairs 
of the west and, therefore, worthy of Bonaparte's diplo­
matic consideration.
vii
INTRODUCTION
The Treaty of Tilsit of 1807 between France and 
Russia was a minor slowing of the flow of the Napoleonic 
Wars that dominated European affairs in the early nine­
teenth century. It united the two nations in a war 
against Britain, but, in larger terms, it polarized 
continental Europe into two separate and distinct spheres 
of influence. Therefore, although the Treaty achieved a 
fitful peace, it was not intended to serve as a perma­
nent agreement and stop hostilities.
The period surrounding the treaty has often been 
depicted by historians as a psychological battle between 
the two emperors, Tsar Alexander I of Russia and 
Napoleon Bonaparte of France. Although the intrigue of 
personalities poses several interesting questions about 
the Europe of the period, the causes of and reactions 
to the Treaty of Tilsit involve several larger, more 
tangible issues.
Bonaparte spread a revolution that promoted a new 
order, a new political system that threatened the status 
quo of all Europe's monarchs. His new methods of diplo­
macy and warfare were met by an archaic series of tra­
ditional alliances which proved their inadequacies time
1
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and again. Russia rose from a position of hapless oppo­
sition to Bonaparte to become a major European power 
with an influence far exceeding any it had held before.
The Treaty of Tilsit revealed Russia's new-found promi­
nence and found Alexander and Russia attempting to develop 
a diplomatic policy to meet the challenge.
Finally, problems of maintaining the peace in an 
ethnically diverse, highly populated area of politically 
divergent nations prevailed throughout the Napoleonic 
period. This question is approached from ideological 
and pragmatic directions and notes the emergence of a 
strong nationalism among all participants. Prince Adam 
Jerzy Czartoryski of Poland, Russian Foreign Minister to 
Tilsit, emerged in the midst of such problems as a mostly 
ignored architect of a nineteenth-century version of 
peaceful coexistence.
This study covers the events leading up to the Treaty 
of Tilsit as well as the immediate reactions to it. It 
will attempt to sort out the tangled alliances and mo­
tives that culminated with Tilsit. It will also offer a 
reprisal of the significance of this highly romanticized 
meeting of east and west and suggest the often forgotten 
implications of its failings.
CHAPTER I
RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AFTER THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
The French Revolution of 1789 created a ripple of 
apprehension throughout the European monarchies. For the 
first time in European history, rule by divine right had 
been questioned and outwardly rejected. The question the 
revolution posed for the remaining monarchies was whether 
they could continue to exist or whether they would be 
eliminated. Each country's reaction toward France was 
subsequently guided not only by self-interest but also by 
the fear of the spread of the revolution. The ebb and 
flow of European relations during the Napoleonic years 
represent a vacillating struggle to achieve and maintain 
peaceful coexistence and a sturdy alliance system.
One of the best examples of that period of diplo­
matic fluctuation was the Treaty of Tilsit signed between 
Napoleon Bonaparte and Alexander I of Russia in 1807.
To understand the complexities involved in this treaty, 
Russia's attitude toward France must be discussed.
In July 1789 when the French Revolution occurred, 
Catherine II was the Tsarina of Russia. Although con­
sidered to be an enlightened despot, Catherine pursued a
3
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course of imperialism and Russian dominance, especially 
in regards to Poland (the so-called "Northern accord") 
and in the Balkans (the "Greek Project"). She was quite 
knowledgeable of things French. She corresponded with 
Voltaire and held many of the French philosophes in high 
regard. It was no wonder, then, that she watched the 
events of the French Revolution with a certain horror.
Her major fear, of course, was that anti-monarchic senti­
ments might spread to Russia. In October of 1789, 
Catherine broke off all diplomatic relations with France.
Less than four years later, she signed a treaty of 
mutual friendship and assistance with Britain. In it, 
Russia and Britain agreed not to make peace with France 
until all of the French territories, illegally acquired 
since 1789, were returned. Russia also agreed to help 
Britain in the war at sea by closing her ports to France 
and by helping to curtail French maritime trade.
Besides her obvious fear of the revolution, Catherine 
may have been reacting to another stimulus, a document 
which today remains part fact and part fiction. Referred 
to as the Will, or Testament, of Peter the Great, this 
document was supposedly left in the Russian archives by 
Peter the Great himself. It was a blueprint for con­
tinental change including: the partition of Poland, the 
defeat of Turkey and, most importantly, the aggrandizement
5
and prosperity of Russia through her direct involvement 
in European affairs.
There are varying accounts of how and when this docu­
ment made its way to France and came to public attention 
in Russia. One traces the French discovery of the Testa­
ment to Chevalier d'Eon, a colorful man sent to 
St. Petersburg to spy for the French government during the 
Seven Years War. Another credits Polish General Michel 
Sokolnicki for making the document public in 1797. Still 
another links the Testament to Maurice de Talleyrand's 
successor as the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Charles Louis Lesur, who in 1812 produced an anti-Russian 
propaganda book based on its contents.'*’
Whether or not any of these accounts is true, or if 
any document bearing any resemblance to the Testament 
ever existed, the story itself indicates the difficult 
atmosphere in which Russia was trying to become accepted 
as an equal in western diplomatic circles. Two different 
generalizations can be made regarding the Testament of 
Peter the Great and its influence in dictating Russian 
policy. If it did truly exist, Russia may have been 
simply taking it as a guide for the future. If it was 
a mythical document, the lengths to which both France and 
Poland went to embarrass Russia show the fear that Russia 
produced in other European nations.
6
In November 1796, Russian rule changed hands. When 
Paul I succeeded his mother, Catherine, he decided that 
his foreign policy should have two main goals: to oppose 
the ideals of the French Revolution and to maintain and 
expand the Russian presence in the Mediterranean. Both 
goals could be pursued with the opportunity afforded by 
the French occupation of Malta in June 1798. Paul was 
The Grand Prior of the Order of the Maltese Knights, and 
it appears that he had the idea of using the knights as
an instrument with which to impede the spread of revolu-
2tion. The French occupation of Malta gave him the per­
fect excuse to intervene in the affairs of the Mediter­
ranean .
As French hostilities and aggressions continued 
throughout Europe, Russia joined forces with Great 
Britain, Austria, the Kingdom of Naples, and Ottoman 
Turkey to form a second coalition against France. (The 
first coalition was a war which Bonaparte inherited from 
the Directory. Essentially it refers to the early 
battles in Italy where Bonaparte gained his fame.) 
Initially, it seemed to be a mutually satisfactory align­
ment. As problems developed among the powers, however, 
the coalition began to weaken.
In 1800 Britain seized control of Malta from the 
French and decided to retain possession of it. This 
occupation created an immediate shift in Russian policy,
7
for now Britain posed more of a direct threat to Russian 
interests than France did, so Russia withdrew from the 
Second Coalition.
The period that followed, during the winter of 1800- 
1801, became known as the rapprochement. As the threat 
of France seemed to be waning, Paul was able to survey 
both Europe and Bonaparte in a new light. Conversely, 
having the enemy reduced by one, Bonaparte was able to 
speculate about the idea of having Russia as an ally. In 
many ways, this period of rapprochement foreshadowed the 
Treaty of Tilsit six years later.
Because formal diplomatic relations between Russia 
and France had never been re-established after October 
1789, this period of good feelings was remarkable. Paul 
reinstituted the League of Armed Neutrality against 
Britain. Bonaparte countered by offering to liberate, 
without exchange, six thousand Russian prisoners taken
3captive by France during the recent battles. Simul­
taneously, France and Austria were holding peace negotia­
tions at Luneville.
The influence that Russia enjoyed in continental de­
cisions became evident in subsequent events. Paul wished
to play the role of ^.arbiter of Europe, especially in
4German affairs," as Catherine had done in the past.
In the negotiations at Luneville, talks between France 
and Austria were nearly deadlocked. The major disagreement
8
involved France's refusal and Austria's wish to allow 
Britain's entrance as a negotiator on the Austrian side. 
The Russian emissary, Georg-Magnus Sprengporten, on 
arriving in Luneville got the talks back on track. Oddly 
enough, it was a chain of misconceptions that accelerated 
the entire process.
Unknown to Austria, Sprengporten's one and only as­
signment was to accept Bonaparte's release of the afore­
mentioned Russian prisoners. France, though, capitalized 
on Austria's belief that Sprengporten was in Luneville to 
represent Russia in the formal meetings and managed to 
claim additional sanctions. Austria's misconception led 
her to proceed with the negotiations without Britain's 
support. Subsequently, Austria suffered substantial 
territorial losses attributable directly to Luneville and, 
Austria thought, to Russia.5
The signing of this treaty on February 9, 1801, tem­
porarily brought peace to Europe and left Britain as 
France's only adversary. The treaty signified that 
Russia's influence in continental affairs was growing 
in more ways than on the battlefield.
It must be remembered that despite this seeming 
Russian-French rapprochement, nothing between the two 
nations had been formalized. Formal relations were 
never renewed from the break made by Catherine in 1789. 
Simultaneously then, with the proceedings at Luneville,
9
Count Fedor V. Rostopchin, Russian Chancellor and Presi­
dent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made France 
aware of the Russian terms for a new alliance. Up to 
this point, Paul's only concern at Luneville had been for 
the integrity of Sardinia, Naples, Bavaria, and Wurtten- 
berg. He decided to turn to Rostopchin for his expert 
opinion on foreign affairs and his advice on how best to 
proceed with France. According to Hugh Ragsdale, 
Rostopchin believed that France "had met her master in 
Bonaparte, who nurtured his power on fame and conquest, 
humbling Austria, frightening Prussia into submission, 
but not being able to reach England, his archenemy. In 
these circumstances Russia held the key to the European 
balance of power, and the fact of Bonaparte's generous 
offer to liberate the Russian prisoners indicated that he 
realized it. He was seeking to strengthen himself by en­
listing Russia in the ranks."6
Paul agreed with Rostopchin. Their plan was to send
Stepan A. Kolychev, Vice-Chancellor of the College
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to meet with Bonaparte and
Charles Maurice Talleyrand, the French Foreign Minister,
in hopes of gaining a new alliance. Talleyrand, who was
suspicious of Russian interests and impatient with her
delays, now attempted to influence the Russian court
through a collection of unlikely correspondents, using
7procedures far removed from the standard.
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With Paul's new-found attraction to Bonaparte and 
his admiration for Bonaparte's military skills, there are 
some indications that he was considering the use of 
Russian troops to help Bonaparte invade India and begin 
the destruction of British colonialism. Whether or not 
this was an actual plan is of little importance, because 
a palace coup took place in St. Petersburg in March 1801, 
after which Paul's son, Alexander I, assumed the throne 
of Russia. Russia's attitude toward France and Bonaparte 
thus took another new direction.
NOTES
■'"Dimitry V. Lehovich, "The Testament of Peter the 
Great," American Slavic and East European Review 7 (April 
1948), pp. 111-124.
2Barbara Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign 
Policy 1814-1914 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Com­
pany, 1964), p. 26.
3Hugh Ragsdale, "The Origins of Bonaparte's Russian 
Policy," Slavic Review XXVII (March 1968), pp. 85-90.
4Ibid., p. 85.
5Hugh Ragsdale, "Russian Influence at Luneville," 
French Historical Studies 5 (1968), pp. 274-284.
6Hugh Ragsdale, "The Origins of Bonaparte's Russian 
Policy," p. 88.
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CHAPTER II
ALEXANDER I'S POLICY TOWARDS FRANCE
The reign of Alexander I marked a change in direction
and orientation of Russian foreign policy from that of
his predecessor, Paul I. Among Alexander's first official
acts upon taking the throne was to re-establish friendly
dealings with both-Britain and Austria. He also called
upon Rostopchin's enemy, the Francophile and Anglophile
Count N. P. Panin, to head the College Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.1 Upon sending Count Arkadii Ivanovich Morkov to
Paris as the Russian ambassador, Alexander wrote a long,
detailed instruction that summarized his thoughts about
2Russia and her involvement in European affairs.
Alexander wrote to Morkov on June 27, 1801:
In order to achieve the entire goal that I seek,
I will begin by describing for you my [main] pur­
pose, toward which you should direct all your 
attention and for which develop modifications that 
might be appropriate when considering any circum­stances that can be foreseen. In deciding to pur­
sue the ongoing negotiations with France towards the end of last year, I had been guided by a double 
motive— one of which was to guarantee for my empire 
a state of peace and tranquility necessary for re­
establishing order in the different administra­
tive parties, and at the same time to cooperate 
as far as it could be in my power the hastening 
of a definitive peace, which would at least give 
Europe the time to restore structure to the
12
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social system, shaking it down to its founda­
tions, so that providence would never again per­
mit the source of the disaster to dry up, which affects humanity.3
It was Alexander's desire to "esperer d'attendre en 
alliant la fermete a la justice et a la moderation."^
The age of Russian expansion was drawing to a close 
and a major directive in Alexander's foreign policy ob­
served that trend and aimed to preserve the boundaries 
that Russia had already established. "If I ever raise 
arms," Alexander wrote on June 4, 1801, in a circular note 
to Russian diplomatic representatives abroad, "it will 
be exclusively in defense against aggression, for 
the protection of my peoples or of the victims of ambi­
tions that endanger the peace of Europe. . . .  I shall 
never participate in the internal dissensions of foreign
5states.
Except for a brief flourish of initial changes, 
Alexander's foreign policy was not formalized until 1803 
with the issuance of the "Instruction." It was drawn up 
by Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski and the members of 
Alexander's informal committee, a group of advisors who 
functioned as a sort of cabinet to Alexander. In his 
Memoirs, Czartoryski described this committee as "a 
Secret Council composed of persons whom he [Alexander] 
regarded as his friends and believed to be animated by 
sentiments and opinions in conformity with his own."6
14
Those who comprised the informal committee were all 
friends of Alexander from his youth: the aforementioned 
Czartoryski, Count Paul Stroganov, Count Victor Kochubei, 
and Nicholas Novosiltsev. They also hoped for the 
presence of Alexander's former tutor F. C. LaHarpe, al­
though he declined to participate regularly. In addition 
to this informal committee, several other members of the 
Russian intelligentsia were consulted from time to time. 
Included In this list were: Count Alexander Romanovich 
Vorontsov, Count Nicholas Semyonovich Mordvinov, Prince 
Platon Alexandrovich Zubov and Count Mikhail Mikhailovich 
Speransky, and others.
The informal committee stopped meeting in 1803 be­
cause all of the four members accepted posts in 
Alexander's government. Czartoryski became Deputy Minis­
ter of Foreign Affairs under the aforementioned 
Vorontsov, Stroganov became Deputy Minister of Justice, 
and Kochubei and Stroganov served as Minister and Deputy 
Minister of the Interior, respectively. Alexander had 
carefully laid the groundwork for an orderly system of 
foreign affairs by surrounding himself with people he 
trusted and admired. Czartoryski mentioned that
Although the new system of policy was often criti­
cised on account of vagueness and utopianism, it 
soon had serious and practical results. It was 
impossible to take prominent part in European 
affairs, to come forward as a judicial and
15
moderating influence, to prevent violence, injus­
tice and aggression, without coming into contact with France at every step. She would have been a 
dangerous rival if she had wished to play the 
same beneficent part; but being led by the un­
limited ambition of Napoleon, she sought to do 
the very contrary of what we wished. A collision sooner or later was inevitable.7
Alexander's foreign policy became clear in 1803 with 
the completion of the earlier work by the informal com­
mittee. In a letter to Bonaparte on April 10, 1803, 
Alexander noted "It is with great pleasure, that I see 
the affairs of Germany finally come to their end: and one 
must attribute this happy ending to the common measures 
in this case taken by Russia and France whose union and 
wisdom is not only valued by the two states, but must be 
regarded as very essential for the happiness and tran­
quility of all Europe."8 Indeed, Alexander already under­
stood that the peace of Europe depended in large part on 
an agreement between Russia and France. George Vernadsky 
credited that result coming from Alexander's "instruc­
tion" as "one of the significant documents in the de­
velopment of international law, since it proposed a pro­
ject for international organization which should be con­
sidered as a prototype for the League of Nations. It 
was also one of the first Panslavic declarations, since
it suggested the liberation of Slavs, both in Central
gEurope and the Balkans." The "instruction" revealed 
the idealism of both Alexander and Czartoryski. The
16
underlying principles behind it reappeared in their sub­
sequent involvements in the affairs of Europe.
Unfortunately for Russia and the remainder of the 
Slavic nations, the "instruction" did not become Russia's 
policy. It had been drafted with both France and Britain 
in mind, as a show of Russian interests and aims in 
Europe, during the very brief time when hostilities be­
tween France and Britain had temporarily ceased. Peace 
had been declared on March 27, 1802, in the Treaty of 
Amiens, which brought nine years of animosities to a 
shaky end. Britain's primary interest, despite this 
treaty, had been and still remained the defeat of France 
not the stabilization of Europe.
With the Treaty of Amiens in mind, Czartoryski
began the monumental task of trying to sway Britain to
Russia's favor. Czartoryski realized, as did most of
Europe, that France and Russia were on a collision
course with destiny. He noted that
The two Emperors went in opposite directions in 
everything; one demolished, while the other re­
stored, old ideas; and the comparison made be­
tween them was not to Alexander's advantage in the eyes of the very Russians for whom he was 
working. He was, in fact, not all that popular during the first few years of his reign, although 
he was never more devoted than he was then to 
the good of his country.
With obvious Russian and French tension ahead and 
the lofty aims of the "instruction" to guide him, 
Czartoryski proceeded to draft the plans for a Third
17
Coalition against France. It must be remembered that, 
while he was serving Russia, Czartoryski was a Polish 
prince whose nationalistic tendencies were obvious. 
Several times during his service to Alexander and Russia 
Czartorysky offered to step down from his position on 
the grounds that his interest in Poland perhaps hampered 
him in fully serving Russia's needs. In terms of en­
lightened service,however, Czartoryski was a most able 
diplomat.
Alexander was, at this point in 1804, still main­
taining the position held by both his grandmother and 
father, which viewed Russia as a great arbitrator in 
European affairs. He still saw Russia as an integral 
part in "a system of defense to prevent any further ad­
vance or aggression on the part of France upon the terri 
tory or independence of the rest of Europe."^ ^ But an 
event in early spring, that scandalized much of Europe, 
served to set Alexander's policies off in a different 
direction.
On March 15, 1804, a former Bourbon prince,
Due d'Enghien, was abducted by one of Bonaparte's agents 
from his castle in non-aligned Baden. He was taken to 
France, tried by a military commission, and executed on 
March 20. The news of these events sent the court of 
St. Petersburg into official mourning. Not only was the 
Due d'Enghien taken from the native home of the Russian
18
Empress Elizabeth Alexeievna, but Alexander also saw 
Enghien's death as a murder and his abduction as a vio­
lation of Baden's rights of neutrality. He immediately 
sent a note of protest to Paris. "The reply soon came: 
it was harsh and insulting. Talleyrand, at that time 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, reminded Russia that when
Paul was assassinated, France did not consider herself
12justified in demanding an explanation." Overall, the 
event increased the Russian court's sympathy for French 
emigres and heightened its disrespect for Bonaparte.
Coupled with the deterioration of the Treaty of 
Amiens by May 1803, the assassination of the Due d'Enghien 
brought Russia to the point of reconsidering policies. 
France was advancing into Germany, occupying both Hanover 
and the southern Kingdom of Naples, and showing interest 
in the Mediterranean. Although the possibility of a 
Russian confrontation with France was slight, a policy of 
containment was now a necessity.
By late 1803, control of the Russian foreign 
ministry had passed almost completely from Count Simon 
Vorontsov, who had clearly served as a figurehead, to 
Czartoryski. The first hint of a Russian-British alliance 
was made in a dispatch from Vorontsov to Czartoryski dated 
November 20, 1803. In it, Vorontsov suggested that, from 
what he could ascertain, France aimed at breaking up the 
Ottoman Empire and once again attempting to seize Egypt
19
as a route to India. The Russian ambassador in Paris, 
Arkadii Ivanovich Morkov, noted Bonaparte's willingness 
to threaten war in Egypt in a letter dated February 16,
18 03, sent to Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov.'*'^  Regarding 
this, Morkov said that Bonaparte "would declare war im­
mediately, he already had an army of 400,000 soldiers 
that he would augment with another 50,000 men, he would 
try to execute a political fall in England, that he would 
place himself at the head of this expedition."16
The news of such plans would undoubtedly evoke anti- 
French sentiments in both Russia and Britain. Czartoryski 
believed that the Turks of the Ottoman Empire should be 
removed from Europe, yet he did not want another European 
nation with any established base of power located there.
In philosophical terms, he also saw Russia as a protec­
torate of the coreligionists in the area and favored
Russia's benevolent control over Poland to be a pattern
17for Russian dominance in the Balkans. The threat of a
French invasion of India, of course, was intolerable to
Britain. In a speech given on July 22, 1803, by British
Foreign Minister William Pitt, Britain's true feelings
about the inevitability of war with France were evident.
That the result of this great contest will ensure 
the permanent security, the eternal glory of this 
country; that it will terminate in the confusion, 
the dismay, and the shame of our vaunting enemy; 
that it will afford the means of animating the 
spirits, of the rousing courage, of breaking the 
lethargy of the surrounding nations of Europe;
14
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and I trust that, if a fugitive French army should reach its own shores after being driven from our 
coasts, it will find the people of Europe reviving 
in spirits and anxious to retaliate upon France 
for all the wrongs, all the oppressions, they have 
suffered from her; and that we shall at length see 
that wicked fabric destroyed which was raised 
upon the prostitution of liberty, and which caused more miseries, more horrors to France and to the 
surrounding nations, than are to be paralleled in any part of the annals of mankind.
Despite such favorable conditions for it in 1803, 
the formation of another coalition against France was be­
set by hesitation and differences of opinion among those 
nations that would have to form it. Austria was hesitant 
to ally with Russia and Britain because of the distasteful 
outcome of the Second Coalition and the peace concluded 
at Luneville. Prussia was hoping for some type of French 
constancy, while Sweden was eager to join a coalition and 
hoped to maintain the status quo while suppressing French 
revolutionary tendencies.
Alexander and Czartoryski believed that to oppose
France meant more than to defend Europe militarily; it
meant creating a new order for the continent for years to
come. Czartoryski believed that
It would have been a great advantage to obtain the concurrence in our views of so powerful and 
influential a State as England and to strive with her for the same objects; but for this it was neces­
sary not only to make sure of her present inclina­
tions, but to weigh well the possibilities of the 
future after the death of George III and the fall 
of the Pitt Ministry. We had to make fngland 
understand that the wish to fight Napoleon was not 
in itself sufficient to establish, an indissoluble 
bond between her Government and that of
21
St. Petersburg, and that such a bond, to be per­
manent, most be based not on a common feeling of 
revenge, but on the most elevated principles of 
justice and philanthropy.19
Throughout 1804, most of the dispatches from
St. Petersburg to London were delivered by special Russian
envoy Nikolai Nikolaevich Novosiltsev. Czartoryski said
of Novosiltsev that "in one hour's talk [he] would be
20able to say more than a hundred sheets of paper."
Because there were both formal and private discussions
being held at this time, that method was used rather than
operating through the legitimate Russian ambassador to
Britain, Simon Vorontsov. Although both Czartoryski and
Alexander had high regard for Novosiltsev's skills in the
art of diplomacy, they were worried about his highly
visible pro-British sentiments. For this reason,
Czartoryski stayed in private contact with Vorontsov in
London about all the ongoing negotiations that both he
and Novosiltsev were undertaking. Writing to a friend in
1836, Czartoryski gave his opinion of Novosiltsev: "a
man without faith or principles, but very clever and
21astute, and with much knowledge."
Late 1804, therefore, found Russia negotiating with 
nearly every European state in hopes of forming a workable 
coalition. Early on in the negotiations, Russia was 
hoping to receive British financial support in a war with 
France. In a letter to Count Simon Vorontsov, the Russian 
Ambassador at London, dated June 26, 1804, the British
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Foreign Secretary Lord Dudley Ryder Harrowby briefly
described what Britain hoped for in a coalition that would
merit British financial support.
The particular appointment, to be regulated by a 
future treaty, must depend, not only upon the 
forces which each Power could bring into the field, but upon its means of maintaining them, and in 
some degree, upon the quarter in which they may 
actually be employed.
This appointment must evidently be different 
from the two suppositions
First. That Russia may be able to engage both 
Austria and Prussia in the contest.
Secondly. That Russia may be joined by one of 
these Powers only— in either case, some portion 
might be left to bring forward any of the smaller 
States, and particularly Sweden, in case that monarch should transport his troops into Pomerania, 
and co-operate, not merely for the defense of 
that province, but also for the independence of 
the north of Germany.22
On September 11, 1804, secret instructions from
Alexander I to Novosiltsev complemented those already re-
23ceived by Vorontsov in.London. (For a complete English 
translation of this document refer to Memoirs of Prince 
Adam Czartoryski, pp. 41-51.) The main premise of the 
"Secret Instruction" was to explain France's role in 
Europe to the potential members of the coalition and sub­
sequently to show how to create a new balance of power.
The most powerful weapon hitherto used by the French, and still threatening the other European States, is the general opinion which France has managed to promulgate, that her cause is the 
cause of national liberty and prosperity. It 
would be shameful to humanity that so noble a cause should be regarded as the monopoly of a 
Government which does not in any respect deserve 
to be the defender of it; it would be dangerous 
for all the Powers any longer to leave to France
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the great advantage of seeming to occupy such a 
position. The good of humanity, the true in­
terest of the lawful authorities, and the success 
of the enterprise contemplated by the two powers, 
demand that they should deprive France of this formidable weapon.24
Alexander and Czartoryski, in the "Secret Instruc­
tion," believed that the only way France could be stopped 
was through a Russian and British agreement. Their two­
fold goal was to liberate Europe from Bonaparte's yoke 
and ensure a lasting peace among the nations. Achieving 
this would inevitably mean a war pitting Russia and 
Britain against the French government, but not against 
the French people. The result of such a war would be 
Europe's freedom from Bonaparte's rule and the realiza­
tion of the right of national self-determination.
Czartoryski, recognizing the idealism in this idea, 
took it one step further by trying to create a more 
rational balance of power in Europe. He hoped to use 
the victory as an opportunity to establish a formal league 
of nations which would be governed by a code of inter­
national laws, including a type of world court which would 
be used to mediate disputes and thereby avoid war. In 
addition to this, Czartoryski believed that to maintain 
peace and harmony throughout Europe, the current concept 
of political boundaries would have to be re-evaluated.
His suggestion was a redefinition of European boundaries 
according to the principle of natural frontiers,
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but supplemented by the realities of nationality, eco­
nomics, and geography.^
The details of this proposal called for a preventive 
system designed to inhibit a recurrence of French ag­
gression. Central to this plan was the creation of a 
federation of German and Italian states, protected by 
both Prussia and Austria. In exchange for the resulting 
advantages for Prussia and Austria, Russia would gain 
sovereignty over Poland. And from the Ottoman Empire 
Russia hoped to receive some combination of Moldavia, 
Cattaro, Corfu, Constantinople, and the Dardanelles.
Although both nations eventually agreed upon the 
notion of an alliance and the subscription of other na­
tions to their plan, harmony ended there. Russia 
favored a complete reconstruction of the map of Europe, 
based on natural boundaries and nationalities. Britain 
favored status quo ante bellum, with France returned to 
her former boundaries. Russia was also willing to 
negotiate with Bonaparte and offer France a chance for 
reconciliation, while Britain wanted France to admit to 
being guilty for causing the existing problems in Europe. 
Russia was willing to accept any form of French govern­
ment— a Bonaparte regime or a restoration of Bourbon 
rule--as long as it was friendly to Russia. But Britain 
believed that a victory over France was the only way to
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2 7peace. William Pitt carefully detailed British policy 
regarding a potential concert of Europe in a memorandum 
dated January 19, 1805. In his memorandum the Prime 
Minister listed three distinct aims for such a coalition
1st To rescue from the Dominion of France 
those Countries which it has subjugated since the 
beginning of the Revolution, and to reduce France 
within its former limits, as they stood before 
that time.--
2ndly To make such an arrangement with respect to the territories recovered from France, as may 
provide for their Security and Happiness, and 
may at the same time constitute a more effectual 
barrier in future against Encroachments on the 
part of France-.—
3rdly To form, at the Restoration of Peace, a 
general Agreement and Guarantee for the mutual 
protection and Security of different Powers, and 
for reestablishing a general System of Public Law in Europe.--28
A potential rupture in the negotiations came in January 
1805 when Bonaparte proposed that France and Britain 
should conclude peace. King George III commented on the 
Emperor's offer:
I have received pacific overtures from the chief 
of the French Government, and have in consequence 
expressed by earnest desire to embrace the first opportunity of restoring the blessings of peace, 
on such grounds as may be consistent with the 
permanent interest and safety of my dominions; 
but these objects are closely connected with the 
general peace of Europe. I have, therefore, not thought it right to enter into any more particular 
explanation without previous communications with 
those Powers on the Continent with whom I am 
engaged in confidential intercourse and connection 
with a view to that important object, and especi­
ally the Emperor of Russia, who has given the 
strongest proofs of the wise and dignified senti­
ments with which he is animated, and of the warm interest which he takes-in the safety and indepen­
dence of Europe.29
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But much to Britain's dissatisfaction, Russia pro­
ceeded to a series of secret agreements with Austria and 
Sweden. These accords, then, combined with Britain's 
pressing fear of isolationism, became the impetus for 
England to pursue a workable coalition with Russia without 
further considering Bonaparte's overtures. Vorontsov's 
formal negotiations and Novosiltsev's more covert deal­
ings successfully induced Britain to accept a compromise 
after a seven-month struggle over details.^0
The Anglo-Russian Treaty, with separate, secret, 
and additional articles, was provisionally formalized on 
April 11, 1805. But Britain, much to Russia's surprise, 
failed to ratify the treaty. Opposition to the treaty in 
Britain was spearheaded by Prime Minister William Pitt, 
who was reluctant to concede the Kingdom of Italy to 
Joseph Bonaparte, concerned about a new code of maritime 
law, and hesitant about the return of Malta to Russian 
protection. Regarding this final point, it must be 
remembered that during the reign of Tsar Paul I, Russia 
desired the control of Malta and the Maltese Knights, a 
remaining vestige of the age of chivalry. Britain, on 
the other hand, insisted on keeping Malta because it was 
her only remaining naval base in the Mediterranean.
The British rejection of the treaty terms caused a 
stir among those in St. Petersburg who were waiting to 
confront Bonaparte with a coalition. From London on May
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10, 1805, Vorontsov wrote to Czartoryski, "You tell me 
that if England will not yield Russia will not ratify the 
Convention. That being so, I can only regard the negotia­
tions as broken off. The Continent will be enslaved, 
and this country will either make peace before Christmas 
and keep Malta, or will continue a defensive war which 
will cost it little money and will preserve the rock which 
is the cause of all the existing difficulties."31
In another letter, eight days later, Vorontsov
wrote:
I may be blamed for not having in my official re­
ports stated that England would never consent to 
the evacuation of Malta, but I could not anticipate 
that such a demand would be made by our Government, 
as the matter was never mentioned to me, and in the conferences which M. de Novosiltzoff had with 
Mr. Pitt, both alone and in my presence, there 
was no question of England abandoning Malta. . . .
The proposed new code of maritime law is equally out of the question, and Lord Harrowby assured me 
that if Lord G. L. Gower [British Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Court of 
St. Petersburg] had yielded on these points he 
would have been recalled, and never again employed 
in the diplomatic service. The Government here 
would have preferred that he should have altogether 
refused to accept the note you addressed to him on 
the subject of the maritime code, and that he 
should have replied to you verbally that Great 
Britain simply adheres to her practice during the 
last two centuries in this matter, which is in 
accordance with her treaties with Russia, Sweden, 
Denmark, and Hoiland.32
The British government softened its position some­
what as time passed. But Pitt's address to the British 
Parliament on June 21, 1805, revealed the problems that
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constantly plagued the coalition, hesitation and lack of 
dedication. Said Pitt:
I am ready to allow that the alliance of Russia 
alone would not promise such effacious or power­
ful co-operation as it would make it worth while 
to protract the war on account of any hope it 
would hold, or even equivalent for the large vote 
of credit which is demanded; but it is my opinion 
that even the limited co-operation of even a few 
of the Powers, and for a short time, may be ma­
terial service in the course of the war, in pro­
tecting those points which the enemy appear particularly anxious to attack.33
In early July 1805, France annexed Genoa. This 
move, coupled with, the negative British position regarding 
Malta, encouraged Alexander to accept Britain's treaty 
terms. Lord Gower responded by immediately signing it in 
its newly revised form on July 28, 1805. On August 9, 
Austria also signed the treaty.
At this pont, Novosiltsev was supposed to proceed 
on behalf of the coalition to Paris and present to 
Bonaparte the ultimatum deciding Europe's fate. His pre­
sentation was supposed to coincide with the day that 
Russia moved armies into both Austria and Prussia--August 
16. Several papers in Hamburg, however, printed the news 
of the cancellation of this mission by Alexander and 
eliminated the diplomatic impression it could have made. 
Instead, what remained was an allied force of Russian, 
British, Austrian, Hanoverian, and Swedish troops poised 
for their next move.
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CHAPTER III
THE CONDITION OF EUROPE: 1805-1807
The Third Coalition, formed in the summer of 1805, 
was a fragile union of hurried alliances, put together in 
response to Bonaparte's plans of aggrandizement. Despite 
all the negotiations prior to the agreement in 1805, it 
satisfied neither Russia nor Britain in the long term 
and was ill-fated from the outset.
The first problem faced by the coalition was to de­
cide the status of Prussia. King Frederick William III 
was content with his position of neutrality. While at­
tempting to deal with several domestic problems in 
Prussia, he saw non-alignment as the most beneficial way 
by which he could pursue and ensure peace for his 
country. His beliefs were supported, not only by several 
members of the Prussian court, but also by Prussia's 
omnipresent fear of the French and the problems that 
opposition to them could create.
The coalition needed the full cooperation of Europe 
in order to dictate terms to Bonaparte. The exclusion of 
Prussia would only create a crack that France would seek 
to penetrate and widen. The coalition felt, in respect
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to Prussia, that two alternatives were available: either 
to induce Prussia to join them by offering monetary 
and territorial gain or to force the issue militarily.
Such were the inauspicious beginnings of a coalition 
which both Alexander and Czartoryski had idealistically 
seen as the road leading to a new Europe. Czartoryski 
wrote of this in his Memoirs saying: "I must admit that 
the improbability of Prussia entering into the concert of 
the Powers was not what I most regretted. I did not 
neglect any arguments calculated to persuade her, but I 
foresaw with satisfaction the necessity of disregarding 
her interests in the event of a refusal, for in that 
case Poland would have been proclaimed a kingdom under 
the sceptre of Alexander."1 Part of Poland was currently 
under Prussian rule; and, in the plan offered to 
Alexander, Czartoryski saw those Poles rising up and join­
ing Russia in opposition to Prussia. Despite his obvious 
concerns for the fate of Poland, Czartoryski's interests
have been seen by Marion Kukiel as generated by the most
2noble of intentions for a better Europe.
The coalition's plan was to attack France from all 
sides. Britain was to press the naval campaign, while 
Russia and Austria were to attack with combined armies 
through central Europe and pick up help from such minor 
allies as Hanover and southern Italy. Czartoryski 
favored the plan to force the Prussians into the coalition
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by declaring war on them at the appropriate time. He
believed that Prussia was Russia's natural enemy and
that an invasion of Prussia offered a logical solution to
the problem. More important, though, were his secret
hopes for a reunified Poland through an armed Russian
intervention. Upon entering Prussian Poland, Alexander
would be hailed as a liberator and could thus reunify
Poland by assuming the throne. To this plan both Britain
3and Austria gave their qualified consent.
Alexander, however, hoped to rekindle Prussian 
friendship and avoid unnecessary battles. Possibly sens­
ing the troubles ahead, he was already beginning a gradual 
return to his initial policy of observing the European 
situation from a careful distance. Czartoryski, in spite 
of his strong nationalistic attractions toward Poland, 
did his best to serve Alexander and Russia as Foreign 
Minister. The disagreement over Prussia, however, ef­
fectively marks the beginning of the decline of 
Czartoryski's influence on Russian affairs in Europe and 
also marks a change in Alexander's notion of Russia's 
role there.
From the first formation of the coalition, Austria 
had hoped that Russia could persuade Prussia to join.
This wish was largely motivated by self-interest, because 
Austria did not want Prussia to enjoy any more influence 
in northern German affairs than it already did. Austrian
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policy-makers believed that if Prussia was not allied 
with Austria, exactly that situation would prevail. It 
was Austria's belief that, if she were allied with 
Prussia, France would have no opportunity to interfere 
with Hapsburg rule in northern Germany where Austria 
presently held an upper hand.
Austria had hoped that its involvement in the coali­
tion would not only help it maintain the status quo in 
Germany but also help to reclaim Austrian positions in 
Italy which France- had been assuming. Austria was not 
prepared for a war with France when she entered the 
coalition. From early on, Austria suffered from military 
ineffectiveness in an age when Bonaparte's army was 
revolutionizing the art of warfare. Austrian military 
reforms were slow to take hold, and several strategic 
errors allowed Bonaparte to occupy Vienna in November 
1805. That French movement was quickly followed by the 
crushing defeat of the Austrian-Russian army at Austerlitz 
on December 2, 1805.
Before the year was out, Austria withdrew from the 
coalition and signed a separate peace with France in the 
Treaty of Pressburg (Bratislava). Signed on December 26, 
1805, the treaty acknowledged Austria's loss of power in 
Italy and resulted in a declaration of independence for 
the kingdoms of Bavaria, Wurttemburg, and Baden. Russia,
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to plot her next move, retreated far enough east to be out 
of Bonaparte's immediate reach.
Czartoryski sadly noted in his Memoirs that "I 
should have liked to bring the two Emperors together so 
as to ensure the safety of both, but I did not succeed.
The Emperor Francis [Austria] went off in a different 
direction, but he charged me from time to time to com­
municate with Alexander some words of consolation. These 
were always the same, assuring us that he had already
experienced similar disasters, and that although the blow
4fell mainly upon himself, he was far from losing hope."
The defeat of Austria and Russia at Austerlitz left 
Prussia alone to deal with France. As Austria had feared, 
France induced Prussia to remain neutral by offering her 
the coveted possession of Hanover, the key to a power 
base in northern Germany. It is interesting to note that, 
prior to her defeat at Austerlitz, Russia was making 
similar promises to Prussia to induce her to join the 
allies. Pitt and Britain had been firmly opposed to that 
alliance, but they learned of the Prussian-Russian 
negotiations too late to protest.^
Like Alexander, Pitt felt that the tide of the 
European war hinged on whether Prussia decided to align 
with France. Even after Austerlitz, Pitt sought support 
for Prussia at home and abroad. Speaking in November 
1805 at a banquet in his honor, he stated "Europe is
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not saved by any single man. England has saved herself 
by her exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by
gher example." But Pitt did not live to see the final 
outcome. The man, who for the previous two years had 
directed the course of British foreign policy, died on 
January 23, 1806.
The Prussians found themselves in the unattractive 
position of acting as a French satellite. On February 16, 
1806, they signed another treaty with Bonaparte, the 
Treaty of Paris. This forced agreement required that 
Prussia supply troops in any future battles with Russia 
and added her to the economic blockade known as the 
Continental System. Britain responded to the new situa­
tion by declaring war on Prussia on June 11, 1806.
Realizing that it was no longer maintaining a posi­
tion of neutrality, Prussia decided to turn the tables 
and declare war on France. As Austria had earlier done, 
Prussia picked the worst possible time for such a sig­
nificant change of strategy. Unfortunately for both 
Russia and Britain, Austria, due to recent losses, had 
been a negative factor in the Third Coalition. That, 
combined with Russia's recent retreat out of Bonaparte's 
reach, left Prussia to fight the French on her own.
France soundly defeated Prussia at the battle of Jena- 
Auerstadt on October 14, 1806, once again exhibiting
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the remarkable style of Napoleonic warfare. Eugene Newton 
Anderson explained one of the many difficulties faced by 
Frederick William III:
The history of his reign to his point had been 
that of careful investigations and consultations, 
each ending in disagreement and further consulta­
tion. The practice continued before, during, and 
after the battle of Jena. The duke [of Brunswick, 
general in charge of Prussian troops] was undecided 
and consulted the king; the king was uncertain and 
consulted the duke; both were uncertain and con­
sulted the staff officers. They were still dis­
cussing the proper strategy when Napoleon attacked. 
Further consultation was not necessary to estab­lish the fact or even the degree of the defeat.^
It must be remembered that Britain, upon the untimely 
death of Pitt, underwent a change in direction with the
creation of a new government. William Wyndham, Lord 
Grenville, became Prime Minister in February 1806, and
one of Pitt's major adversaries, Charles James Fox, became 
Foreign Secretary. The stage seemed set for Bonaparte to
make a move.
In March 1806, a packet of dispatches was delivered 
to a British naval officer just off the coast of Dover by 
a French vessel flying the flag of truce. In this packet 
were two letters from Maurice de Talleyrand addressed to
oCharles Fox. These two letters were a response to Fox's
earlier letter of February 20 which initiated a call for
9secret peace negotiations between the two nations. This 
was not, however, the officially santioned British policy 
as shown in King George Ill's response to the trans­
action .
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The King has read the correspondence which has 
passed between Mr Fox & Mr. Talleyrand and regrets 
very much that his name should have been mentioned 
in any way, as he is by no means anxious to re­
ceive commendation from such a quarter. His 
Majesty trusts that his confidential servants will 
upon consideration of what has passed think it 
their duty to quash at the outset any idea or pro­
posal of negotiations, and that Monsieur Talleyrand's 
communication in which an opening is given, will 
be looked upon as one of a nature entirely private 
to Mr Fox and therefore not requiring official 
notice.10
France lessened Fox's hopes for peace by insisting 
that Russia not be involved in the negotiations. But that 
kind of secrecy was expressly prohibited by the agreements 
made when the coalition was formed. The episode shows the 
skill of Talleyrand and Bonaparte in playing ally against 
ally in order to create dissension within the coalition. 
Thus, Fox could do nothing but attempt to resume Pitt's 
policies and renew the war with France.
As was often the case with this coalition, the 
allies' policies were contradictory. As Britain hoped to 
increase the scope of continental war, the Russian 
entourage was returning home to lament its loss at 
Austerlitz and re-evaluate its policy. The break between 
Alexander and Czartoryski had by now become almost com­
plete. Alexander wanted neither to accept the respon­
sibility for the defeat nor to admit that Czartoryski's 
plan involving Poland may have proved to be wiser. In­
stead, Czartoryski became a political scapegoat for
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Alexander, and his role and influence diminished until 
his departure from the foreign ministry in June 1806 . ^  
Czartoryski continued throughout 1806 to draw up 
plans for a Russian recovery. He still favored his plan 
of allying Russia more firmly with Prussia than with 
Austria. He believed Russia should be pressuring the 
Ottoman Empire to take a defensive stand against France, 
even if that meant reinforcing Russian power in the 
Adriatic. He also believed that the relationship with 
Britain should be closely maintained, because, besides 
Russia, only Britain could stand up to Bonaparte. If 
war became a reality, he believed Russia should establish 
two fronts, one in northern Europe and one in the Ottoman 
Empire. In Europe, the Poles, along with the Prussians, 
would lend assistance; and, in the southeast, a similar 
approach, using nationalism as a motivation, would
induce the Greeks and southern Slavs to support the
„ . 12 Russians.
Alexander was taking Czartoryski's advice less and
less, and,in most cases, he acted directly contrary to 
13it. The Tsar, instead, was moving much closer to a 
policy of peace at all costs and war only if Russian soil 
was threatened. Czartoryski, in a memorandum to 
Alexander dated January 17, 1806, attempted to remind 
him of what their original goal had been upon the
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formation of the coalition and how the tsar's present
philosophy contradicted those beliefs.
Russia does not wish to acquire anything for her­
self, but she is not willing, and she ought not, 
to lose the place and character which a century 
of glorious achievements has assigned her. 
Satisfied with her advantages, her only ambition 
has been to preserve the weak against the attacks 
of the strong; her weapons have been appeals to 
the right and justice, and she has only used 
force when those weapons have proved ineffectual. 
When the employment of force has also not been 
successful, the general confidence of mankind 
has been her reward, or has made her forget her 
temporary reverses.^
Fox had been frequently consulting Czartoryski about
the possibilities of renewing the war with France. 
Czartoryski, while eager to act, was in a position of 
diminished authority, a situation which both Nikolai 
Nikolaevich Novosiltsev and Pavel Alexsandrovich Stroganov 
were also experiencing.15 But Alexander was thinking 
along different lines, entertaining notions of negotia­
ting a peace treaty with France and turning his back on 
continental affairs. Frustrated at being unable to
serve Russia to his. best ability, Czartoryski got 
Alexander to accept his retirement from office. In his 
final official memo to Alexander on March 22, 1806, he
again stressed the potential problem in Russia's course 
of action.
During the last four years Russia and her allies 
have four times made overtures of peace to Napoleon, and on each occasion the shameful con­
ditions which he imposed and the outrageous pre­
tensions which he put forward rendered peace
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impossible. . . . Finally, England— the only Power
which by her dominion over seas can in combination 
with us still justify the hope of a possible 
equilibrium in Europe--always faithful to our 
alliance, always frank in her transactions with 
us and strict in fulfilling them, showed herself ready to second us everywhere, and was actually doing most effectually in the Mediterranean and 
on the Adriatic.16
Alexander, assuming the role of Foreign Minister,
proceeded in the opposite direction. He decided to send
Pierre d'Oubril to Paris as Russian plenipotentiary to
negotiate peace terms. A treaty was concluded in July
1806. Several reports suggested that Alexander decided
to sign this peace despite the concessions that Russia
17 .would have to make to France. The reaction in St. 
Petersburg,however,was much different. Eventually, 
Alexander saw the futility of abandoning Europe in favor 
of France and did not ratify the treaty. His change of 
heart was due primarily to dissatisfaction with its 
terms, especially regarding France's dominance in 
Germany (which Alexander did not care to recognize), 
Bonaparte's dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, and 
the organization of the Confederation of the Rhine. 
Desiring to save face before the members of his court, 
Alexander banished Oubril from Russia for his role in 
drafting this treaty.
Alexander now found himself needing an able foreign 
minister to replace Czartoryski. While many, both in 
Russia and particularly in Britain, hoped for the return
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of Czartoryski, such was not to be. Instead, Alexander 
invited Andrei Gotthard Budberg to serve in that position. 
Budberg had been one of Alexander's tutors, but he was 
neither as close a friend as Czartoryski nor as ideo­
logically compatible with Alexander. Due in part to his 
ever-failing health and in part to the monumentak tasks 
he faced in following the charismatic Czartoryski,
Budberg's influence on Alexander was slight during his 
short tenure. The policies that Budberg advocated for 
Russia were a return to those of Catherine the Great. He 
suggested not only conquest in Poland and partition in
Turkey, but also a coalition with France against
D .. • 18 Britain.
In October 1806 France attacked Prussia in an at­
tempt to divide the coalition even further. Acting on a 
personal commitment to Frederick William III which dated 
back to the spring in Memel in 1802, Alexander called 
the Russian forces back into action. Slowly, the Russian 
army moved westward in response to the French attack.
While Russian forces were moving to the aid of 
Prussia, other non-Russian forces were being moved into 
the Danubian principalities, territories which Russia 
sought. Since about 1802, Russia had had some control 
over local appointments of officials, or hospodars, in 
both Moldavia and Wallachia. This movement was part of 
a growing Russian presence in the Balkan region which
45
greatly concerned Sultan Selim III of the Ottoman Empire. 
Russia's difficulties gave the Sultan a chance to recoup 
some of his control in the Balkans.
The role of the Ottomans in the coalition was 
founded on a somewhat traditional Franco-Ottoman friend­
ship. This had been breached, however, in 1798 when 
France invaded Egypt and threatened Ottoman territory dur­
ing the Second Coalition. The Ottomans opposed France 
during the War of the Second Coalition and concluded an 
armistice and peace in 1801-1802. A general lessening of 
the Ottoman Empire's control over its outlying provinces 
shortly followed. Its weakened position was exacerbated 
by Russia's access to the Mediterranean, its protectorate 
over the Ionian Islands, and its involvement in Moldavia 
and Wallachia.
In a response to this heightened Russian influence, 
Selim III attempted to resume the Empire's former alli­
ance with France in 1802. Bonaparte would agree only if 
Selim III followed a strictly anti-Russian policy. As 
this failed to materialize to his liking by late 1805, 
Bonaparte instead made overtures to Persia for an alli­
ance and hoped that the Ottomans would remain neutral. 
While French military successes weakened the Third Coali­
tion, Selim III planned to save his empire and regain 
lost territory by now allying with France and Persia.
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When the Ottoman Empire resisted Russian influence in
the Danubian region, Russia quickly countered by sending
troops. This whole episode culminated in the Ottoman
19declaration of war on Russia in December 1806.
Involved in the Prussian-French confrontation and 
at war with the Ottomans, Russia now was involved in the 
two-front war that Czartoryski had warned against since 
the defeat at Austerlitz. Near the end of 1806, the 
French had captured Prussian papers that exposed the 
earlier Russian-Prussian agreement at Memel. Bonaparte 
now realized that Alexander had been playing France and 
the allies against one another and he decided to go to 
war against Russia. In December 1806 he advanced into 
Poland and won a major victory against Russia at Eylau 
on February 8, 1807.
Bonaparte was now in a dangerous situation. His 
troops had advanced far into Poland and were short on 
supplies and in a difficult position for quick, accurate 
communications with rear command and Paris. The situa­
tion in which Bonaparte found himself reflects his notion
that diplomacy should always be a reflection of military 
20strategy. His uncertainty about Austria's and 
Britain's positions led him to pursue peace if for no 
other reason than to replenish his forces.
With Russia caught in a two-front war, Bonaparte 
had once again effectively spread out and splintered his
47
opposition in Europe. Prussia was presently being held 
at bay. Austria's Foreign Minister, J. P. Stadion, was 
strongly opposed to France, but problems, both internally 
and externally, left Austria afraid of any potential war. 
Britain's "Ministry of All the Talents" was hardly 
Austria's sympathetic ally of the Pitt years, and British 
indecision left the coalition lacking in solidity.
When war between Russia and France resumed in the 
spring of 1807, Russia's allies did not come to its aid. 
The grand plan to -reorganize Europe had dwindled to a 
series of diplomatic maneuvers and well-choreographed, 
lightning-quick battles. The final blow was dealt to the 
Third Coalition on June 14, 1807, when Russia suffered 
another major military defeat at Friedland.
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CHAPTER V
DRAFTING THE TREATY OF TILSIT
The Third Coalition came to an end with the French 
defeat of the Russians at Friedland, a battle which 
Bonaparte described at the time as being "as decisive as 
Austerlitz, Marengo and Jena.""*- Despite the French vic­
tory, Bonaparte was impressed with the Russian army and 
had no desire to pursue an eastern European campaign 
any further. Bonaparte's wish was to arrive at a speedy 
settlement and free himself for more important issues: 
the formulation of a new policy regarding Britain and the 
reorganization of his holdings in Italy and Germany.
Alexander was, by that point, thoroughly disillu­
sioned with the Third Coalition. He resented the British 
lack of dedication to being involved in continental af­
fairs, the ineffectiveness of Austrian troops and poli­
tics, and Prussia's quick surrender to the French. He 
believed, after suffering another major defeat at the 
hands of the French, that the only chance to save his 
reputation, both at home and throughout Europe, was by 
forging a major diplomatic triumph in cooperation with 
Bonaparte.
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Following the battle at Friedland in East Prussia 
(now Pravdinsk in the Soviet Union), Alexander sued 
Bonaparte for peace, and the stage was set for the dra­
matic meeting between the two emperors at Tilsit. The 
first meeting between Alexander and Napoleon indicated 
both the geopolitical reality as well as the anticipation.
In terms of historiography, this scene is most of­
ten recounted when discussing Tilsit for it is the pre­
cursor to modern meetings of heads of state. Unfortu­
nately, much of the significance of Tilsit is lost in 
the appeal of the theatrics. Albert Vandal best 
described the meeting:
At this moment, Alexander had two objects of 
aversion, England, which poorly supported him, and 
Austria, which failed to answer his entreaties.
One is assured that the first word to the Emperor 
was the following: "Sire, I hate England as much 
as you."— In that case Napoleon would have 
responded, "peace is made."2
In fact, the tone of the negotiations had an air of
high drama with the bulk of the lengthy discussions being
conducted on a raft in the Niemen River equidistant from
each bank. That location had been a concession made by
Bonaparte to show respect for Alexander's rank. Maurice
Paleologue well depicts the romantic setting:
The arrangements of that memorable interview, the 
decor, the setting, the behaviour of the chief actors and the supernumeraries, all the details 
of that grand spectacle have been fixed for long in 
the popular imagination: the raft in the middle of 
the Niemen; the two Emperors publicly proclaiming
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their friendship; their smiling walks together arm 
in arm, through the gaping little town; their 
interminable rides along the banks of the river 
and in the neighbouring forests; their military 
parades; the solemn distribution of decorations 
to the bravest soldiers in both armies; the 
enthusiastic fraternisation between the Imperial 
Guard of Russia and of France and their rapturous shouts of: "Long live the Emperior of the East!
Long live the Emperor of the West! Then, in the 
evening, the two monarch's withdrawing anew for long and secret confabulations, from which they emerged equally delighted with each other.3
Despite the setting, historical consensus agreed 
that Bonaparte had never intended that Alexander be his 
equal either in stature or in power on the continent, 
either immediately or in the future. The negotiations and 
subsequent treaty represented another in a long history of 
Napoleonic diplomatic triumphs. But, in contrast to that 
consensus, historians have speculated widely about 
Alexander's motives and his reasoning.
At least one has interpreted Alexander's diplomacy
4as having been a "desertion of Prussia at Tilsit." It 
is that point which separates the Treaty of Tilsit from 
the previous continental agreements made during Alexander's 
reign. Prior to Tilsit, Alexander had adhered to the 
1802 Memel agreement that tied his hands in all in­
stances to favor Prussia and which left Russian policy to 
be, in some cases, not in Russia's best interests.
Another view, more sympathetic to the French, analyzes 
from a larger perspective the reasons Russia signed the 
Treaty of Tilsit. "In all classes of [Russian] society
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abuse was showered on the man who lost the battle of 
Friedland and, to crown his infamy, had 'prostrated him­
self at the feet of the victor and faternised with him.' 
Never before, people said, has Russia, Holy Orthodox
Russia, the Russia of Peter the Great and Catherine the
5Great, submitted to such ignominy." In one way, Tilsit 
represented a pivotal point in Alexander's psychological 
make-up, for while he was led by Bonaparte to believe 
that he was his equal, Alexander's own nation and his 
allies were shocked and disappointed by his actions.
The treaty was concluded in separate accords on 
June 29 and July 9, 1807, and signed in the city of Tilsit 
(now Sovetsk). In addition to arranging an armistice 
with France, Alexander also acted on behalf of both 
Prussia and Poland. The majority of the final decisions 
came out of the meetings held between Alexander and 
Bonaparte. Their agreements were then passed down to 
a smaller committee which formalized the ideas into a 
treaty. In these meetings Talleyrand represented France, 
and Prince Alexander Borisovich Kurakin and General 
Prince Dmitry Lobanov-Rostovsky represented Russia.
The treaty, which was made known to all of the 
European powers, consisted of twenty-nine articles that 
dealt primarily with new boundaries and new rulers of 
continental Europe. It also hinted at a series of new 
alliances which were actually formalized in a series of
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secret articles. The secret articles, which were known 
within a few months, were not published in Britain, 
neither in the Times nor read into the Parliamentary 
records. (See the appendix for an English translation 
of the treaty which appeared in the Times (London) on 
August 8, 1807.)
That the treaty was punitive to both Austria and 
Prussia was not surprising, since neither of those na­
tions was a strong ally in the coalition nor a difficult 
adversary for the French army. Of the two nations, Prussia 
suffered the most severe losses. The French occupation 
of Prussian territories following the battle of 
Friedland was settled by the treaty, resulting in a loss 
of nearly one-half of Prussia's population and one-third 
of Prussian territory. (See Article IV in the appen­
dix.) Also by the terms of the settlement, Prussia agreed 
to reduce its army to 40,000 men and to pay a war in­
demnity of some one hundred million francs to France.
It was only through Alexander's personal appeal to 
Bonaparte that Frederick William III was allowed to remain 
on the throne of a Prussia now reduced in size. (See 
Articles IV, V, and XI in the appendix.). In this 
respect, Alexander remained at least superficially true 
to his pledge given to Frederick William III at Memel.
Prussian and Austrian losses since the formation 
of the coalition in 1805 included two major setbacks that
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predated the Tilsit accords: the abolition of the Holy 
Roman Empire and Bonaparte's acceptance of the Protec­
torate of the Confederation of the Rhine, both of which 
took place in 1806. Many of the German states that were 
included in the Confederation had at one time or another 
been under Austrian or Prussian control. They were now 
divided among the four German client states that France 
had acquired since the revolution and formed the heart of 
the Confederation: Baden, Bavaria, Hesse-Darmstedt, and 
Wurttenberg.
Another section of the treaty (Articles V, XIV, 
and XVIII), which specifically named rulers to several 
thrones throughout Europe, allowed Bonaparte to affirm 
nepotism in his empire and to raise members of his family 
to monarchial status. From Prussian territory the King­
dom of Westphalia was created, over which Bonaparte 
placed his brother, Jerome, as king. Louis Bonaparte was 
made King of Holland, and all of these were united in the 
Confederation of the Rhine. Throughout the period from 
1806 to 1808, several other family members were given 
royal positions. The period surrounding the Treaty of 
Tilsit represented a peak in Bonaparte's goal of empire 
and dynasty.
Poland's configuration also changed because of 
Tilsit. (See Articles V, VII, and IX in the appendix.)
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Prussian Poland became the Grand Duchy of Poland under the 
direct rule of the King of Saxony, another French puppet. 
The parts of Poland acquired by the Russians in the 
previous forty years still remained under Russian con­
trol. Yet, to regard Poland from a strictly geographic 
standpoint, it is not clear why Bonaparte would not cede 
additional Polish holdings to Russia under any circum­
stance, for in many ways Poland acted as a buffer between 
Russia and the west, which now was quite apparently a 
French dominion. For Bonaparte to cede additional 
territory to Russian Poland, however, would be to open 
the door to Polish hopes for a reunification and subse­
quent independence. The fate of Poland at Tilsit high­
lights a recurring motif in Polish history which pitted 
its eastern identities against its western ones and left 
Poland caught in the middle, never able to act strongly 
in either direction.
The remaining sections of the treaty dealt with 
peace settlements, alliances, and diplomatic intervention. 
Regarding the recent Russian and Ottoman declaration 
of war on one another in 1806, Bonaparte offered to 
serve as a mediator to make an equitable peace between 
the two empires. (See Article XXIII in the appendix.)
In a secret clause to the treaty, Bonaparte also pledged 
to Alexander that should negotiations fail, France would 
enter the conflict on Russia's side. A similar agreement
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was reached in Tilsit regarding Britain. In this case 
Russia assumed the role of mediator and potential ally to 
France. If Britain could not come to terms with France, 
Russia would join France in a declaration of war on 
Britain; and a secret clause outlined an ultimatum which 
would be delivered to Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal in 
that circumstance. The ultimatum would demand closing 
ports to Britain and British goods and breaking off diplo­
matic relations with Russia and France. Together, Russia 
and France would declare war on any nation failing to 
comply.
The Treaty of Tilsit ended the Third Coalition. It 
reunited Russia and France for the first time since 1801. 
The similarities between that period of rapprochement and 
this new one became evident almost immediately. The 
treaty appeared on the surface to reduce Europe to two 
friendly regions, one dominated by Russia and the other 
by France.
The treaty succeeded in buying time for Europe to 
attempt to forge a more desirable peace. But, as usual 
throughout the entire Napoleonic period, that peace could 
only come from war.
The immediate effects of Tilsit achieved peace 
through the polarization of Europe (except for Britain) 
into spheres of territorial control. The position of 
virtually every European nation had now been decided by
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either defeat or declaration. The only major remaining 
question mark was Britain, and, with Russian policies 
being more favorable to France, Bonaparte could turn all 
of his attentions directly to Britain's defeat. In ef­
fect, while the Treaty of Tilsit created an atmosphere of 
peace, in reality it was a calm before the storm, leaving 
the nations of Europe wondering what was going to happen 
to the European balance of power in the coming months and
years.
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CHAPTER V
EFFECTS AND REPERCUSSIONS OF THE TREATY OF TILSIT
The Treaty of Tilsit left Europe in a state of dis­
array. Austria and Prussia were downcast and defeated, 
both without strong allies and without competent armies. 
Their many internal problems had combined with their 
failure to adapt themselves to Bonaparte's recent 
geopolitical changes in Europe. After Tilsit, they 
found themselves subservient to France, without much hope 
of mounting a successful opposition or constructive re­
action to French aggression.
Britain, as a result of Tilsit, found itself to be 
the target of France's attempt to remove it from the 
European arena. By forming a rapprochement, with Russia 
and arranging mainland Europe in a temporarily satis­
factory alignment, Bonaparte gained the time and oppor­
tunity to focus his attentions on Britain. Unwittingly 
perhaps, or blinded by hubris, Bonaparte never realized 
that he had granted Russia the same freedom of action as 
France. Alexander, despite the agreements of Tilsit, was 
not interested in challenging Britain. Other goals soon 
became more attractive.
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Immediately following the Treaty of Tilsit, Bonaparte 
was at the peak of his control over Europe. His position­
ing of various relatives on the thrones of Europe was his 
direct attempt not only to show this power but also to 
legitimize his empire in terms which all the monarchies 
of Europe would understand and fear. Since 1802,
Bonaparte had doubled France's territorial holdings. The 
next step of his plan was to ensure the maintenance of 
his empire by enforcing the Continental System against 
Britain and thereby weakening Britain's economic influence 
on the continent.
Bonaparte's Continental System had been initiated, 
though not named as such, as early as 1800-1801 with the 
French-Russian period of rapprochement, when Tsar Paul I 
revived the Russian League of Armed Neutrality. Essen­
tially, the Continental System called for the exclusion 
of all British goods from ports under French control.
But the system did not declare that European goods could 
not be exported to Britain. The system was conceived as 
being punitive for Britain, but not for the rest of 
Europe. The underlying concept was to reduce Britain's 
income, create a drain on her treasury, and ultimately 
stop the flow of British money to France's enemies.
British financial support of France's enemies obviously 
concerned Bonaparte, therefore he hoped to weaken Britain 
economically. Britain was a major naval power during
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Napoleonic times and virtually untouchable by any con­
temporary navy. From this, Bonaparte reasoned that eco­
nomic warfare would defeat Britain in a way that the 
French navy could not.
As Bonaparte's domination of Europe expanded, so 
did his ability to enforce the blocking of British imports. 
Despite Britain's huge empire, she could not ignore the 
European market without weakening the British economic 
system.
France, befotre 1803, also had holdings in North 
America which Britain feared could be the start of a 
rival colonial system that could possibly challenge 
British markets,'*' although, by the time of Tilsit,
Bonaparte had forgotten about world domination and was 
focused primarily on Europe.
On November 21, 1806, Bonaparte issued the Berlin 
Decree. This document announced that Britain was now 
in a state of blockade and that all nations were pro­
hibited from importing from or exporting to Britain. 
Bonaparte warned that British goods in European terri­
torial waters would, from that day on, be seized and 
oconfiscated. The Berlin Decree marked the official 
establishment of the Continental System. When the 
settlement at Tilsit was concluded, Britain was 
effectively shut out of European affairs— economic as 
well as political. Bonaparte was able, at long last,
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to enforce his Continental System against Britain and 
expected to receive help from virtually every European 
port and nation.
Britain was in a difficult political situation—  
as well as economic. During the French-Russian negotia­
tions at Tilsit, Britain was again faced with the task of 
creating a new government. Lord Grenville's so-called 
"ministry of all talents" had collapsed in early March 
1807. Both Grenville and Foreign Minister Charles James 
Fox had hoped to ensure peace for Britain during their 
short period of power. Despite Britain's inactivity on 
the European battlefield, her role in all the previous 
European coalitions had been a major one, for Britain 
had poured large sums of money into continuing the oppo­
sition to Bonaparte. In 1805-1806, Pitt had provided 
seven million British pounds to help support the wars of 
the Third Coalition. With the change from Pitt to 
Grenville in early 1806, the subsidies decreased to a 
relatively small amount. The allies viewed this decrease
as a sign of British selfishness and withdrawal from
2continental affairs. Because of Grenville's cautious 
policies and because of the growing pressures of the 
Continental System, Britain had gradually withdrawn from 
financial support of even limited warfare against
France.
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In the spring of 1807, the Duke of Portland, William 
Cavendish Bentinick, became the titular head of the 
British government. With him, two of Pitt's proteges 
came into power. George Canning became the foreign secre­
tary and Lord Robert Stewart Castlereagh became the 
secretary of war. After the failings and hesitation of 
British policy following Pitt's administration, these 
three men represented a return to Pitt's concepts of
coalition— staunch opposition to France and support for
3European unity. The new English government sought quite 
different things for Europe from those presented to it by 
the Treaty of Tilsit.
The initial British reaction to the Treaty of Tilsit 
was published in the London Times on August 12, 1807.
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the 
Times, though not an official organ of the British govern­
ment, often described official British policy. The 
columns of the Times provided a forum for discussion but, 
more importantly, served to spread information to the 
British upper classes. Parliamentary debates, govern­
mental decrees, and world developments were all prominently 
displayed in the pages of the Times.
The mood following Tilsit was one of utter contempt 
for the French and especially for Bonaparte. "Everything, 
in short, within the range of his power, is to be cut 
and modeled after the French fashion. As if the concern
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of the French Empire was insufficient for the vast grasp
of his mind, he has gratuitously assumed the regulation
and the superintendence of all those Governments he has
4created or tolerated. '!
Overall, the educated British understanding of the 
Treaty of Tilsit saw it as a minor tragedy waiting to en­
large and manifest itself. On August 12, an editor wrote 
"We should have expected that the interferences of 
ALEXANDER, and the peace of Tilsit, would have put an end 
to the exactions and oppressions of these harpies 
[Bonaparte and Talleyrand]. Quite the contrary. The 
spirit of rapine seems to increase in proportion to the 
shortness of their stay in the conquered territories."5 
Yet, in this case, the editors of the Times did not 
seem to see through the publicly announced parts of the 
Treaty to its secret clauses which contained the essence 
of the French-Russian alliance. One month after the 
Treaty of Tilsit was concluded, on August 12, the Times 
printed the following advice:
The difficulties which stood in the way of a 
liberal commercial intercourse, between this Country and Russia, are not, we are happy to learn, likely to last much longer. Some very satisfactory information on this important subject, has been 
received from St. Petersburg. The latest letters 
from that city speak generally with confidence 
as to the removal of the recent restrictions upon 
foreign commerce. It is stated in one of these,
"that things have taken a more favourable turn; and that great hopes are entertained that the
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Commercial Treaty with England will be speedily 
revived, and affairs placed upon their formerfooting."6
Regarding the proposed Russian mediation in the con­
clusion of a treaty between Britain and France, the 
British Parliament concluded that such an arrangement was 
of no benefit to Britain. The Times noted that when a 
similar proposal had been made to France in 1805, 
"Bonaparte refused such mediation. 'No,' said he, 'you 
have an army on foot to force your terms on me; but what 
means have you to.compel England to comply with your 
mediatory proposals?' Why then has he so readily accepted
7this mediation in the present instance?"
As to how that decision further involved Alexander, 
and more importantly the Russian army, Britain hoped 
Russia would be peaceful. Again the Times speculated: 
"'Such are the terms,' he [Alexander] may say, 'I, as im­
partial umpire between you, propose for your acceptance: 
if you refuse them, you must terminate your own quarrels
Oyourself, I desist from any further interference.'"0
In late August, a pamphlet appeared in London en­
titled, "A Key to the recent Conduct of the Emperor of 
gRussia." Although it cannot be considered to reflect 
official British intelligence, the pamphlet demonstrated 
that the Treaty of Tilsit did not escape the notice of 
upper-class British society. The existence of the 
pamphlet showed the concern which some sections of the
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British opposition had about the new Russian-French al­
liance. In it, Alexander' s motives were declared to be ' 
generated by the humiliation of Russian forces on the 
battlefield and Alexander's personal disgust with the en­
tire situation. The pamphlet stated that Tilsit was 
signed because "Alexander could not stoop to receive what, 
instead of being considered due to him, was to be con­
ferred on him as a favour of obligation. He therefore, 
took the weight of the war upon his own shoulders. . . .
The pamphlet's author, whose identity was not revealed, 
maintained that Alexander applied to Britain for a loan 
on his personal account for five million pounds. This 
loan was apparently refused on the basis of Grenville's 
philosophy toward the continental war. Obviously annoyed 
by the refusal, the author of the pamphlet wrote,
Can it be believed, then, that a Country in which 
every hope of Europe was centered, which not only might but ought to have contributed to its sal­
vation, and which, at least, ought to have per­
formed what was its duty, and not favourable to 
ALEXANDER, refused the sum to save the continent, 
which was scarcely more to her than a few drops 
from the ocean? Such was, however, the case.I1
The pamphlet stated the changing policies of Britain 
toward the continent, and especially Russia, because of 
the Treaty of Tilsit. In the mind of the pamphlet's 
author, Tilsit might not have been signed if Britain 
had fervently supported Russia throughout the many coali­
tions and military campaigns. This support, however, had
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to be all encompassing: financial, military, political, 
and emotional. Britain's own irresolute policies con­
tributed heavily to the crisis now faced after Tilsit.
The Times of September 7, 1807, reported about 
another factor affecting British policy— the antagonism of 
the United States of America. The Times reported that 
"The political horizon, both to the East and West, appears 
at present sufficiently dark and louring. Russia on the
one side, and America on the other, are, if reports say
12true, ready to wreak their wrath upon us." The po­
tential conflict with Russia had something to do with 
Britain's defense of the neutrality of the Danish navy. 
This was a relatively small matter which camouflaged the 
underlying British sentiment that "Russia is no match 
for France without the assistance of England. Where then
is the prudence of Russia's uniting with France to sub-
13jugate, or even weaken England?" As Castlereagh's power 
began to increase, British policy turned to the possi­
bility of another coalition with Russia against France. 
With respect to America, Britain was seeing the origins 
of what would culminate in the War of 1812. Britain was 
already questioning America's motives for entering into 
Europe's affairs. The editors of the Times wrote, "They 
are far removed from the scene of European carnage, and a 
more destructive warfare than ever desolated Europe.
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Why would they rush, like a dazzled insect, into a flame
14which does not approach them?"
Britain was now caught in a difficult situation. 
America was reigniting a flame of rebellion, and Russia 
appeared to be joining France in war directed against it. 
In early October 1807, the Times included several reports 
of the recent armistice concluded between Russia and 
the Ottoman Empire and mediated by France. British 
opinion suggested that Russia was making too many un­
necessary sacrifices in the settlement, specifically the 
cession of Moldavia and Wallachia to the Turks. From 
this, Britain, at least as shown by the Times, believed 
that of those provinces Bonaparte would create another 
vassal state for France. "Everywhere he [Bonaparte] is 
cooping up, and surrounding the Russian monarchy, whose 
destruction, were England overthrown, would not linger 
one year; and yet that same Russia hesitates at the part 
she is to act in the present contest between us and 
France; nay, hesitates between hostility to us and bare 
neutrality. . . ,"15 By October 17, reports from 
throughout Europe were printed in the Times recounting 
what Britain had been fearing for several months, an
16embargo of British goods consigned to Russian ports.
In late November, the entire contents of the Treaty 
of Tilsit, except for the secret articles, were finally
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made available in Britain. Reports from the Times' many 
foreign sources reached London and led the Times to pre­
dict :
We cannot wonder at the opinion that Russia will 
be forced or seduced to declare war against us 
ultimately, though it may not take place until spring, when alone the Baltic will be open for 
naval operations, and when the armies of France 
may be ready to punish the Emperor ALEXANDER for 
refusing to join the league, by wresting from him 
his possessions in Poland, Courland, and Livonia, 
not for getting his conquests in the last war, 
secured to him by the peace of Tilsit. ^
Opinion of knowledgeable Russian leaders about these 
developments was no more enthusiastic than those in London. 
Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich, the grandson of Tsar 
Nicholas I, writing in Paris in the early twentieth cen­
tury, remarked: "The new alliance was unpopular in 
Russia but particularly in Moscow. The displeasure did 
not cease until after the rupture; but Alexander, without 
a worry for either public opinion or the complaints of 
the dignitaries, followed the firm path that he had out­
lined, imposing silence not only to those in Moscow so­
ciety, but down to the Imperial Family's nearest rela-
The Russian gentry, dismayed at the terms of Tilsit 
because of the great concessions made to Bonaparte, 
directed the majority of the blame at Russian Foreign 
Minister Budberg. Budberg had attempted to resign from 
service during the Tilsit negotiations, but Alexander 
refused to accept his resignation. Perhaps aware of what
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was to come, Alexander decided to use Budberg as a scape­
goat to bear the brunt of any possible objection to the 
treaty that could arise in Russia. Bulberg, however,
had had no part in negotiating the treaty and had actually
19opposed the idea of a Russian-French alliance.
Near the end of 1807, Alexander dismissed Budberg
and appointed Count Nikolai Petrovich Rumiantsev to the
post of Russian foreign minister. The choice of
Rumiantsev was an interesting one for it allowed
Alexander to proceed with a policy of duality toward
France. Rumiantsev "supported the French alliance, not
as a Western-oriented Francophile who blithely sanctioned
the aggressive conquests of Napoleon but rather as a
patriotic Russian who believed the alliance to be in the
2 0best interests of his native country." As Rumiantsev 
pursued favorable Russian relations with France,
Alexander had, in essence, the perfect decoy in place 
to formulate a covert policy against France.
Rumiantsev's policy proposed that Russia should not 
be directly involved in the affairs of western Europe.
He believed that Russia's coexistence with Bonaparte 
could be advantageous, both diplomatically and terri­
torially, only if Russia were to expand to the north and 
to the south rather than to the west. Rumiantsev be­
lieved that if Bonaparte controlled in the west, he 
would allow Russia a free hand to negotiate with the
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Ottomans in the Balkans and would also tolerate Russian
expansion into Finland and Sweden. Although Bonaparte
would allow Russian domination in both Finland and Sweden,
he would never allow Russia to possess the Straits and
especially not Constantinople. Early in 1808, to prove
his loyalty to the terms of Tilsit and to turn Russia's
thoughts from Constantinople, Bonaparte suggested a joint
venture of Russian and French troops to march into 
21India. Russian imperial ambitions, however, remained
22in the Danubian regions and looked to the north.
After the conclusion of the Treaty of Tilsit, King 
Gustavus IV Adolphus of Sweden, long an enemy of 
Bonaparte, remained true to his alliance with Britain.
The geographic realities of having a hostile nation so 
near to St. Petersburg prompted Russia to invade Sweden 
in February 1808. Sweden was easily conquered and the 
Russian forces proceeded to Finland and annexed it as a 
Russian holding the following month. By late March,
King Gustavus Adolphus abdicated his throne, and Russia 
had expanded territorially and increased the size of 
what was by now referred to as the "empire of the east."
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CONCLUSION
Bonaparte, despite being allied with Russia by 
the Treaty of Tilsit, allowed Russia only limited oppor­
tunities for aggrandizement in comparison to the seem­
ingly limitless opportunities he reserved for French 
expansion. In essence that one-sidedness was the major 
reason Tilsit failed to last as a peace treaty. Although 
Bonaparte schemed to dominate Europe, he believed that 
he could allow Russia to remain a power only in the east.
Bonaparte felt that such an arrangement was needed 
to allow him the time for the formation of new policies 
aimed at continental domination. Tilsit afforded 
Bonaparte the luxury of reshaping Europe without the 
friction generated by Russia that had proved to be more 
than a passing irritation in the past.
Russia, in terms of sheer numbers, had always posed 
a large military threat to any major French campaign. 
Russia was also an unknown quantity of sorts. Up to the 
time of Tilsit, neither Russia's diplomatic nor military 
presence could be accurately assessed. It was only 
after Alexander came to power that Russia's numerically 
superior military forces were augmented by thoughtful, 
cautious diplomacy, fueled with both idealism and
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self-interest. While Tilsit gave Bonaparte a freer hand 
to deal with other matters, including especially Britain, 
it also gave Alexander a similar free hand to pursue 
Russia's interests. That Russia's interests might not 
continue to support France's was a fact not fully ap­
preciated by Bonaparte. In general, Russia could no 
longer be taken lightly in European and Ottoman affairs 
and Bonaparte underestimated her growing role in that 
direction.
Only four years after Tilsit, events made it obvious 
that Bonaparte had overestimated the potential benefits 
of Tilsit and had been over-confident about the immediate 
and longlasting effects of the treaty. During the 
Napoleonic period, Russia asserted her prominence and 
importance in continental decisions, and the Treaty of 
Tilsit clarified that fact. The treaty itself, if we ig­
nore the romanticism surrounding the emperors' meeting, 
offered Russia a practical and significant entrance into 
European affairs.
Britain also recognized Russia's emergence as a 
powerful nation-state. Her fault was not in underesti­
mating a Russian presence, but rather in failing to 
capitalize on this new phenomenon in a timely way for the 
good of Britain and Europe. Britain suffered throughout 
the period by underestimating Russian diplomatic and 
military abilities. British leaders watched Russia gain
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in importance in European affairs, yet they were often 
distracted from the concerns of the continent by their 
many colonial responsibilities. Their age-old hostility 
toward France kept them from matching British policy to 
the new geopolitical realities that Bonaparte was rapidly 
imposing upon the continent. Their hesitancy to use 
Russia as a counterweight in this struggle marked their 
major diplomatic failure of the period.
Russia, and Alexander in particular, more ac­
curately gauged th'e situation. Alexander was not afraid 
to change Russia's policies and alignments to meet changing 
needs. He attempted to enhance Russia's stature in 
Europe and, especially through Czartoryski, to install an 
equitable and enlightened system of peace. Even his 
idealistic policies, which played a less important part 
shortly after Tilsit, were, however, more realistic than 
those of either Britain or France.
Caught in this three-way struggle were all the 
countries of central Europe, most notably Prussia and the 
Hapsburg empire. As a result of the many coalitions and 
of Bonaparte's determination, the Central European coun­
tries either fell under foreign rule or their boundaries 
were radically altered. Essentially these monarchies had 
serious difficulties for which the Tilsit period offered 
only fear, defeat, and frustration.
78
The Treaty of Tilsit symbolized a new system of 
foreign affairs brought about by revolutionary France and 
Bonaparte. The accepted methods of warfare and diplomacy 
were being replaced by modern techniques more suited to 
the times. Once all the nations became accustomed to 
these developments, Europe seemed gradually to settle 
into the status quo ante and to resume the normal, or at 
least regular, course of international affairs--a course 
that led by 1812 to French defeat. But for the historian, 
Tilsit clarified those changes in techniques, changes 
which were often not clear to contemporaries. In general, 
however, the Treaty of Tilsit was more than an annoyance 
to the balance of power in Europe, but less than a trauma.
AFTERWORD
The Treaty of Tilsit offers a strangely ironic 
foreshadowing of twentieth-century European affairs. As 
early as 1805, the ever-growing problems of modern alli­
ances, the rise of nationalism, economic warfare, and 
ultimately, the distinction between eastern and western 
Europe are becoming clear. The Treaty, because of its 
falterings, has often been relegated to a footnote in 
textbooks. But, in terms of western European histori­
ography, the Treaty of Tilsit offers substantial insight 
into many subsequent European conflicts.
For example, if the events surrounding the Treaty 
of Tilsit were extrapolated, they could be considered a 
model for many events leading up to World War II and its 
settlement. They are highly suggestive of the Nazi- 
Soviet Pact, the Winter War, and decisions made at Yalta 
and Potsdam which dealt with many of those same issues—  
Poland, the Balkans, Germany. Czartoryski's policy 
and the failings of the Third Coalition could be an 
eighteenth-century equivalent of Woodrow Wilson and the 
League of Nations. Czartoryski, in this particular 
setting, assumes the role of the misunderstood diplomat
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firmly grounded in idealism, while the rest of the world 
focuses only on current conditions.
The course of French-British relations has been an 
important factor in making Russia the fulcrum of a 
European balance. This role also allowed Russia not 
only to become important in European affairs, she did 
so while still retaining a major position in parts of 
Asia.
Overall, the Treaty of Tilsit offers a glimpse of 
the Europe of the future with a foreshadowing of major 
trends earlier initiated by the French Revolution. The 
revolution essentially proved that monarchies were no 
longer the standard forms of government that they had 
been in the past. Tilsit also showed that alliances 
based on that same system were quickly giving way to 
those based on nationalism and to a diplomacy based on 
the concepts of national self-interest and spheres of 
influence.
In light of Tilsit, it is interesting to read a
passage written by the historian George F. Kennan; while
doing so, one can imagine him to be describing the Europe
of 1807 rather than the one of the twentieth century.
The things people thought they were trying to 
achieve by the long and terrible military exer­
tion in Europe were simply not to be achieved by 
this means. The indirect effects of that war— its 
genetic and spiritual effects— were far more 
serious than people realized at the time. We can 
see, today, that these effects penalized the
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victor and vanquished in roughly equal measure, 
and that the damage they inflicted, even on those 
who were nominally the victors, was greater than 
anything at stake in the issues of the war it­
self. . . . Both sides hoped for more than could
really be achieved. Both underestimated the 
seriousness of the damage they were doing to them- 
selves— to their own spirit and to their own 
physical substance— in this long debauch of hatred 
and bloodshed.^
The Treaty of Tilsit, for all of its shortcomings, 
gave Europe a textbook study of modern international rela 
tions and the problems that come with them. That signifi 
cance of its interpretation was not noticed or remembered 
has proved to be sadly apparent in our current ideologi­
cal east-west conflict.
NOTES
"^George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), 
pp. 9-10.
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ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE TREATY OF TILSIT AS PRINTED IN 
Times (London), 8 August, 1807, p. 1 .
TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF FRENCH, 
THE KING OF ITALY, AND HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF ALL THE
RUSSIAS.
His Majesty, the Emperor of France, King of Italy, 
Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, and his 
Majesty the Emperor of Russia, animated with the same 
interest in putting an end to the devastations of war, 
have, for this purpose, nominated and furnished with full 
power on the part of his Majesty the Emperor of France 
and King of Italy, Charles Maurice Talleyrand, Prince 
of Benevento, his Great Chamberlain, and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour,
Knight of the Prussian Order of the Black and of the Red 
Eagle of the Order of St. Hubert.
His Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, has, 
on his part appointed Prince Kourakin, his actual Privy 
Counsellor; Member of the Council of State, and of the 
Senate; Chancellor of all Orders in the Empire; Ambas­
sador Extraordinary, and Plenipotentiary of his Majesty 
Knight of the Russias to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria; 
Knight of the Russian Order of St. Andrew; of St.
Alexander; of St. Aube; of the first class of the Order 
of St. Wolodimir, and of the second class of the 
Prussian Orders of the Black and Red Eagle; of the 
Bavarian Order of St. Hubert; of the Danish Order of
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Dannebrog, and the Perfect Union, and Bailiff and Grand 
Cross of the Sovereign Order of St. John of Jerusalem; 
and Prince Demety Labanoff Van Rostoff, Lieutenant 
General of the armies of his Majesty the Emperor of all 
the Russias; Knight of the first class of the Order of 
St. Anne, of the Military Order of St. Joris, and of the 
third class of the Order of Wolodimir.
The abovementioned, after exchanging their full 
powers, have agreed upon the following Articles:
ARTICLE I.
From the day of exchanging the ratification of the 
present Treaties, there shall be perfect peace and amity 
between his Majesty the Emperor of the French and King 
of Italy, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias.
ARTICLE II.
Hostilities shall immediately cease at all points 
by sea or land, as soon as the intelligence of the pre­
sent Treaty shall be officially received. In the mean­
while, the High Contracting Parties shall dispatch 
couriers extraordinary to their respective Generals and 
Commanders.
ARTICLE III.
All ships of war or other vessels, belonging to 
the High Contracting Parties or their subjects, which 
may be captured after the signing of this Treaty, shall
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be restored. In cases of these vessels being sold, the 
value shall be returned.
ARTICLE IV.
Out of esteem for his Majesty the Emperor of all 
the Russias, and to afford to him a proof of his sincere 
desire to unite both nations in the bands of immutable 
confidence and friendship, the Emperor Napoleon wishes 
that all countries, towns, and territory, conquered from 
the King of Prussia, the Ally of his Majesty the Emperor 
of all the Russias, should be restored, namely, that 
part of the Dutchy of Magdeburg, situated on the right 
bank of the Rhine; the Mark of Prignitz; the Uker Mark; 
the Middle and New Mark of Grandenburg, with the excep­
tion of the Circle of Kotbuss, in Lower Alsace; the 
Dutchy of Pomerania; Upper, Lower and New Silesia, and 
the County of Glatz; that part of the District of the 
Netze, which is situated to the northward of the road 
of Driesen and Schneidemuhl through Waldau to the Vistula, 
and extending along the frontier of the circle of 
Bromberg, and the navigation of the river Netze and of 
the canal of Bromberg, from Driesen to the Vistula and 
back, must remain open and free of all tolls;
Pomerellia; the island of Nogat; the country on the 
right bank of the Vistula and of the Nogat, to the West 
of Old Prussia, and to the Northward of the circle of
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Culm; Ermeland. Lastly, the kingdom of Prussia, as it 
was on the 1st of January, 1772, together with the 
fortresses of Spandau, Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Breslau, 
Schweidnitz, Neisie, Brieg, Kosel, and Glatz, and in 
general all fortresses, citadels, castles, and strong 
holds of the countries above-named, in the same condition 
in which those fortresses, citadels, castles, and strong 
holds may be at present; also, in addition to the above, 
the city and citadel of Graudentz.
ARTICLE V.
Those Provinces, which, on the 1st January, 1772, 
formed a part of the Kingdom of Poland, and have since, 
at different times, been subjected to Prussia (with the 
exception of the countries named or alluded to in the 
preceding Article, and of those which are described 
below the 9th Article), shall become the possession of 
his Majesty the King of Saxony, with power of possession 
and sovereignty, under the title of the Dutchy of Warsaw, 
and shall be governed according to a regulation, which 
will insure the liberties and privileges of the people 
of the said Dutchy, and be consistent with the security 
of the neighbouring States.
ARTICLE VI.
The City of Dantzic, with a territory of two 
leagues round the same, is restored to her former
8 8
independence, under the protection of his Majesty the 
King of Prussia, and his Majesty the King of Saxony; to 
be governed according to the laws by which she was 
governed at the time when she ceased to be her own mis­
tress .
ARTICLE VII.
For a communication betwixt the kingdom of Saxony 
and the Duchy of Warsaw, his Majesty the King of Saxony 
is to have free use of a military road through the 
States of his Majesty the King of Prussia. This road, 
the number of troops which are allowed to pass at once, 
and the resting places, shall be fixed by a particular 
agreement between the two Sovereigns, under the mediation 
of France.
ARTICLE VIII.
Neither his Majesty, the King of Prussia, his 
Majesty the King of Saxony, nor the City of Dantzic 
shall oppose any obstacles whatever to free navigation 
of the Vistula under the name of tolls, rights, or 
duties.
ARTICLE IX.
In order as far as possible to establish a natural 
boundary between Russia and the Duchy of Warsaw, the 
territory between the present confines of Russia from
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the Bug to the mouth of the Lassona shall extend to a 
line from the mouth of the Lassona along the towing path 
of the said river; and that of the Bobra, up to its 
mouth; that of the Narew from the mouth of that river as 
far as Suradiz; from Lissa to its source near the vil­
lage of Mien; from this village to Nutseck, and from 
Nutseek to the mouth of that river beyond Nurr; and fin­
ally, along the towing path of the Bug upwards to extend 
as far as the present frontiers of Russia. This terri­
tory is for ever united to the Empire of Russia.
ARTICLE X.
No person of any rank or quality whatever, whose 
residence or property may be within the limits stated in 
the above-mentioned article, nor any inhabitant in those 
provinces of the ancient kingdom of Poland, which may be 
given up to his Majesty the King of Prussia, or any per­
son possessing estates, revenues, pensions or any other 
kind of income shall be molested in his person, or in 
any way whatever, on account of his rank, quality, es­
tates, revenues, pensions, income, or otherwise, or in 
consequence of any part, political or military, which he 
may have taken in the events of the present war.
ARTICLE XI.
All contracts and engagements between his Majesty 
the King of Prussia and the ancient possessors, relative
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to the general imposts, the ecclesiastical, the military 
or civil benefices, the creditors or pensioners of the 
old Prussian Government, are to be settled between the 
Emperor of all the Russias and his Majesty the King of 
Saxony; and to be regulated by their said Majesties, in 
proportion to their acquisitions, according to Articles 
V. and IX.
ARTICLE XII.
Their Royal Highnesses the Dukes of Saxe Cobourg, 
Oldenburg and Mecklenburgh Schwerin, shall each of them 
be restored to the complete and quiet possession of 
their estates; but the ports in the Duchies of Olden- 
burgh and Mechlenburgh shall remain in the possession 
of French garrisons till the Definitive Treaty shall be 
signed between France and England.
ARTICLE XIII.
His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon accepts of the 
mediation of the Emperor of all the Russias, in order to 
negotiate and conclude a Definitive Treaty of Peace 
between France and England; however, only upon condition 
that this mediation shall be accepted by England in one 
month after the exchange of the ratification of the 
present Treaty.
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His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias being 
desirous on his part to manifest how ardently he desires 
to establish the most intimate and lasting relations 
between the two Emperors, acknowledges his Majesty 
Joseph Napoleon, King of Naples, and his Majesty Louis 
Napoleon, King of Holland.
ARTICLE XV.
His Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, acknow­
ledges the Confederation of the Rhine, the present state 
of the possessions of the Princes belonging to it, and 
the titles of those which were conferred upon them by the 
act of the Confederation, or by the subsequent treaties 
of accession. His said Majesty also promises, informa­
tion being communicated to him on the part of the 
Emperor Napoleon, to acknowledge these Sovreigns who may 
hereafter become members of the Confederation, according 
to their rank specified in the Act of Confederation.
ARTICLE XVI.
His Majesty the Emperor of all Russias cedes all 
his property in the right of Sovreignty to the Lordship 
of Jever, in East Friesland, to his majesty the King of
ARTICLE XIV.
Holland.
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The present Treaty of Peace shall be mutually bind­
ing, and in force for his Majesty the King of Naples, 
Joseph Napoleon, his Majesty Louis Napoleon, King of 
Holland, and the Sovreigns of the Confederation of the 
Rhine, in alliance with the Emperor Napoleon.
ARTICLE XVIII.
His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, also 
acknowledges his Imperial Highness, Prince Jerome 
Napoleon as King o-f • Westphalia.
ARTICLE XIX.
The kingdom of Westphalia shall consist of the 
provinces ceded by the King of Prussia on the left bank 
of the Elbe, and other states at present in the posses­
sion of his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon.
ARTICLE XX.
His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias engages 
to recognize the limits which shall be determined by 
his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon, in pursuance of the 
foregoing XIXth article, and the cessions of his Majesty 
the King of Prussia (which shall be notified to his 
Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians) together with 
the state of possession resulting therefrom to the 
Sovereigns for whose behoof they shall have been estab­
ARTICLE XVII.
lished.
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All hostilities shall immediately cease betwaen 
[sic] the troops of his Majesty the Emperor of all the 
Russias and those of the Grand Seignior, at all points, 
wherever official intelligence shall arrive of the sign­
ing of the present Treaty. The High Contracting parties 
shall, without delay, dispatch Couriers extraordinary, 
to convey the intelligence, with the utmost possible 
expedition, to the respective Generals and Commanders.
ARTICLE XXII.
The Prussian troops shall be withdrawn from the 
Provinces of Moldavia, but the said Provinces may not be 
occupied by the troops of the Grand Seignior, till after 
the exchange of the Ratifications of the future Defini­
tive Treaty of Peace between Russia and the Ottoman 
Porte.
ARTICLE XXIII.
His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias accepts 
the mediation of his Majesty the Emperor of France and 
King of Italy, for the purpose of negociating a peace 
advantageous and honourable to the two powers, and of 
concluding the same.
The respective Plenipotentaries shall repair to 
that place which will be agreed upon by the two powers
ARTICLE XXI.
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concerned, there to open the negociations, and to proceed 
therewith.
ARTICLE XXIV.
The periods, within which the High contracting 
parties shall withdraw their troops from the places which 
they are to evacuate pursuant to the above stipulations, 
as also the manner in which the different stipulations 
contained in the present treaty, shall be executed, will 
be settled by a special agreement.
ARTICLE XXV.
His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of 
Italy, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians, 
mutually ensure to each other the integrity of their 
possessions, and of those of the powers included in this 
present treaty, in the state in which they are now 
settled, or further to be settled, pursuant to the above 
stipulations.
ARTICLE XXVI.
The prisoners made by the contracting parties, or 
those included in the present treaty, shall be restored 
in a mass, and without any cartel of exchange on both 
sides.
ARTICLE XXVII.
The commercial relations between the French
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empire, the kingdom of Italy, the kingdoms of Naples and 
Holland, and the Confederated States of the Rhine, on 
the one side; and the Empire of Russia on the other, 
shall be replaced on the same footing as before the war.
ARTICLE XXVIII.
The ceremonial between the two Courts of the 
Thuilleries and Petersburgh, with respect to each other, 
and also their respective Ambassadors, Ministers, and 
Envoys, mutually accredited to each other, shall be 
placed on the footing of complete equality and recipro­
city.
ARTICLE XXIX.
The present Treaty shall be ratified by his Majesty 
the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and his 
Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, the Ratifica­
tions shall be exchanged in his city within the space of 
four days.
Done at Tilsit, 7th July, (25th June), 1807,
(Signed) C. MAURICE TALLEYRAND, Prince of Benevento. 
Prince ALEXANDER KOURAKIN.
Prince DIMITRY LABANOFF VAN ROSTOFF.
A true Copy.
(Signed) C.M. TALLEYRAND, Prince of Benevento.
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